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THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED
FOR NEW YORK?
FEATURED LECTURE
JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN⃰
I want to thank the Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal
for asking me to present some insights from my forthcoming book that
have particular relevance here in New York as you consider adding,
changing, or altering your right of publicity laws. The book is titled The
Right of Publicity: Privacy Reimagined for a Public World, and is being
published by Harvard University Press.1
The right of publicity is something that we all have. Sometimes it
is simply thought of as a property right in one’s own personality. More
precisely, it provides the right to stop others from using our
identities―particularly our names or likenesses, and sometimes
voices―without permission, usually for a defendant’s advantage.2
What the right of publicity entails varies widely from state to state.
To make order out of this chaos I created Rothman’s Roadmap to the
Right of Publicity, a website where you can click on a state and find out
what the law is in that particular state.3 My book does not focus on these


© 2018 Jennifer E. Rothman. This annotated essay was adapted by the Author from a transcript
of her lecture given at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law on February 22, 2018, at the
Cardozo Art & Entertainment Law Journal Spring 2018 Symposium. Symposium, New York
Right of Publicity Law: Reimagining Privacy and the First Amendment in the Digital Age, 36
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 601 (2018). Much of the material is sourced from, JENNIFER E.
ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC WORLD (Harvard
Univ. Press 2018). At the time of the lecture, the book was forthcoming, but it is now in print.
Permission is hereby granted for noncommercial reproduction of this Essay in whole or in part
for education or research purposes, including the making of multiple copies for classroom use,
subject only to the condition that the name of the author, a complete citation, and this copyright
notice and grant of permission be included in all copies.
⃰
Professor of Law and the Joseph Scott Fellow, Loyola Law School, Loyola Marymount
University, Los Angeles, CA.
1
JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC
WORLD (Harvard Univ. Press 2018).
2
ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 3, 87–98. Many states limit right of publicity actions to instances in
which a defendant has used a person’s identity for a commercial purpose or advantage. Jennifer
E. Rothman, Commercial Speech, Commercial Use, and the Intellectual Property Quagmire, 101
VA. L. REV. 1929, 1950–59 (2015) (discussing the wide variations in the scope of right of
publicity laws, and the uncertain meaning of “commercial” in this context).
3
See
ROTHMAN’S
ROADMAP
TO
THE
RIGHT
OF
PUBLICITY,
https://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/ [https://perma.cc/B2AJ-MNDE] (last visited May 18,
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variations, but instead takes a broader look at how the right of publicity
lost its way when it became unmoored from its origins in privacy law,
and turned into an intellectual property right. But today I am going to
focus on one state―the state of New York―and on its right of publicity
and privacy laws.
New York is central to the development of both the right of
privacy and the right of publicity in the United States. The archival
research I did for the book reveals the true and lost origins of the right
of publicity, and its connections with the right of privacy. Much of this
history originates right here in New York.
Reclaiming the history of the right of publicity both in New York
and elsewhere provides guidance for how to reimagine the right in ways
that would interfere less frequently with free speech, and copyright law,
and that would not jeopardize the liberty rights of the underlying people
the right is supposed to be helping. At the same time, I suggest in the
book that, properly understood, the right of publicity can address a
number of 21st century problems from revenge porn, to mugshot
websites that for a fee will take down photos (that they posted) of those
who have been arrested, to Twitter-licensed trading cards that display
users’ names and likenesses, to Facebook using our name and likenesses
to advertise Coca-Cola, and more generally using our identities for its
own economic gain by allowing the harvesting of our personal data.4
New York’s statutory right of privacy was enacted in 1903, and
has worked well for over 100 years.5 Last Spring, a “right of publicity”
bill was introduced that would revoke New York’s current statutory
right of privacy, and replace it with something very different, not just in
name, but also in substance.6 The proposed bill would leave New York
without an express privacy law, and would upend over a century of
established privacy law in the state.
By the time of today’s symposium I thought there would be a new
draft of the proposed bill―one that took into account some of the
widespread criticism of it―but so far there has not been one. The draft
bill (from May 2017) is ill thought-out and dangerously expansive in
ways that would limit free speech about public figures, and also

2018).
4
ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 2, 6–7, 97, 182–85. The revelation that Facebook shared (or
allowed the harvesting of) data with Cambridge Analytica became public after this lecture was
given. See Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need to Know as
Fallout
Widens,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
19,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebook-cambridge-analytica-explained.html
[https://perma.cc/PP3K-E6C8].
5
N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50–51 (McKinney 2018) (originally enacted as Act of April 6, 1903,
ch. 132, 1903 N.Y. Laws 308).
6
New York Assembly Bill No. A08155, 2017 Leg., 240th Sess. (N.Y. 2017); N.Y. Civ. Rights
Law §§ 50–51.
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jeopardize the rights of the very people it is supposedly protecting. 7 If
the legislature wishes to update or amend New York’s existing right of
privacy statutes, this draft bill misses many opportunities to change the
law for the better, such as adding statutory damages to protect people
whose identities are used without permission, but who don’t have
sufficiently commercial identities to make a lawsuit worthwhile.8
Because the actual text of the bill is a moving target, there is little
point in focusing here on the proposed language of last year’s draft.
Instead, I want to consider the broader features of the proposed bill, and
its purported goals―so we can keep these in mind as I illuminate the
historical context for the bill. Understanding the true story behind the
emergence of the right of publicity and right of privacy both in New
York and elsewhere lends insights for how to make both privacy and
publicity laws work best for today’s digital age.
Identified Goals of New York’s Proposed 2017 Right of Publicity Bill
There are three primary goals that have been expressed by those
advocating for the adoption of a new right of publicity law in New
York―something that is primarily being spearheaded by SAG-AFTRA
(the Screen Actors Guild-American Federation of Television and Radio
Artists).9 The first is to turn it into a freely transferable right―this
7

The Motion Picture Association of America opposed the bill, as did the National Press
Photographers Association, the Association of American Publishers, the Digital Media Licensing
Association, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, numerous scholars, and many other groups. See,
e.g., Christopher Buccafusco et al., ‘Publicity’ Bill Threat to Free Speech, ALBANY TIMES UNION
(JUNE 19, 2017, 5:25 PM), https://www.timesunion.com/tuplus-opinion/article/Publicity-billthreat-to-free-speech-11231132.php [https://perma.cc/TTP5-7JJP]; Advertisement, Our First
Amendment Rights are Under Attack, ALB. TIMES UNION, June 16, 2017 (listing opponents of
bill); Daniel Nazar, New York Rushes to Enact Terrible Right of Publicity Law, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUNDATION (JUNE 12, 2017) https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/06/new-yorkrushes-enact-terrible-right-publicity-law [https://perma.cc/F76D-EE9Y] (last visited May 17,
2018); Jennifer E. Rothman, Letters Submitted in Opposition to Proposed New York Right of
Publicity Bill, ROTHMAN’S ROADMAP TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY (JUNE 9, 2017, 12:00 PM),
https://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/news-commentary/letters-submitted-oppositionproposed-new-york-right-publicity-bill [https://perma.cc/UR9K-3RLD]; Memorandum from
Jeremy Sheff to New York State Senators and Assembly Members (June 16, 2017) (on file with
Author).
8
I discuss the issue of statutory damages in further depth in ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 97, 183,
208–09 n.40. Notably, California added statutory damages to its right of publicity, then
understood to be the state’s statutory right of privacy for just this reason. Id.; Cal. Civ. Code
§ 3344; Act of Nov. 22 1971, ch. 1595, 1971 Cal. Stat. 3426; Letter from Assemblyman John
Vasconcellos to Governor Ronald Reagan (Nov. 10, 1971), in Governor’s Chaptered Bill File (on
file with Author).
9
These goals were expressed during a roundtable in which I participated at Columbia Law
School. Jennifer E. Rothman, Remarks at the Columbia Law School Kernochan Center for Law,
Media, and the Arts: Right of Publicity Roundtable (Oct. 20, 2017) (announcement at
http://www.law.columbia.edu/events/right-publicity-roundtable [https://perma.cc/2E6D-7D4M]);
see also, Symposium, New York Right of Publicity Law: Reimagining Privacy and the First
Amendment in the Digital Age, 36 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 601 (2018); Right of Publicity,
SAG-AFTRA, https://www.sagaftra.org/right-publicity (last visited May 8, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/F4AT-CR9R].
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would mean that the right can be taken from the underlying identityholders and be held by a corporate entity or some other third
party―something not allowed under current law. As I will discuss, this
is a particularly troubling turn, and also a perplexing choice by the
union, as its members may be particularly vulnerable to losing control
over their own names, voices, and likenesses if the right is made
transferable.
The second goal of the bill is to add a right that extends after
death, often termed a “postmortem right of publicity.” Currently, New
York law provides no such right. The right to a person’s name or
likeness dies with that person. I note, however, that those with
successful professional careers, particularly those who sell products or
provide services, often have trademark rights that survive death, and
several other state and federal claims can already be brought if a dead
celebrity’s identity is used to suggest the endorsement of a product or
service without permission, or if copyrighted images are used.
The third goal of the bill is to address the concern, particularly
among actors, that their performances could be recreated or reanimated
using digital technology. Without limits, the fear is that these computergenerated performances could potentially substitute for hiring actors.
This is by far the most compelling of the suggested changes.
Let’s keep in mind these three goals, transferability, postmortem
rights, and limiting the “replication of professional performance[s],” as
we take a trip back in time to lay the groundwork for the upcoming
panel discussion about what New York should do―if anything―to alter
its privacy laws for the 21st Century.10
New York and the Original Right of Publicity
Most often those who know something about the right of publicity
recognize its origins in the right of privacy that was first adopted in state
tort laws across the United States beginning in the early 1900s. But
most of those familiar with that story view the two rights today as
radically different concepts―two legal rights with a historical
connection, but substantive discontinuity. The right of publicity is often
thought of as the “reverse side of the coin of privacy”, or in other
words, its opposite. The right of privacy is commonly understood as
protecting seclusion, secrecy, and hurt feelings, while the right of
publicity is primarily, sometimes exclusively, thought to protect
celebrities and their economic interests. Privacy is thought of as a
10

This is the digital avatar language from the proposed amendment to the May 2017 Assembly
bill. Jennifer E. Rothman, New York Legislature Amends Right of Publicity Bill for the Worse,
ROTHMAN’S ROADMAP TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY (JUNE 14, 2017 5:00 PM),
https://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/news-commentary/new-york-legislature-amends-rightpublicity-bill-worse [https://perma.cc/7NVT-JMDN].

ROTHMAN ESSAY (Do Not Delete)

2018]

PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR NEW YORK?

6/4/2018 3:18 PM

577

personal right, while publicity as a property right. Despite how frequent
and widespread such claims are, they turn out not to be true.11
The original right of publicity was the right of privacy. 12 They
were one and the same conceptually, and the language of controlling
“publicity” about oneself emerged beginning in the mid-to-late 1800s.
This was the primary feature of the right of privacy that everyone was
calling for in the wake of a host of technological and cultural shifts
driven by the Industrial Revolution.13
New York has long sat as the central figure in both the right of
privacy and the right of publicity’s development in this country.
Although New York was not the first state to pass a bill limiting the
appropriation of a person’s likeness, it was the first to adopt an express
“right of privacy.”14 At its origin, this right of privacy was primarily
about the right to control “publicity” about oneself―when and how
one’s image and name could be used by others in public―the same
concern as today’s right of publicity laws.
Many of the first privacy cases to be decided by courts involve
claims we would think of as typical right of publicity cases: cases in
which a person’s image was used on a product or in advertising for that
product.15 That was true here in New York. Figure 1 is from the 1902
case of Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.16

11

Rothman, supra note 1, at 4–5, 11–44.
ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 11–29 (providing a book chapter titled “The Original ‘Right of
Publicity’” which tells the story of this original right of publicity).
13
Id.
14
Four years before New York passed its statutory right of privacy, what is now N.Y. Civil
Rights Law §§ 50–51, California passed what is known as the “Anti-Cartoon Bill,” a law that
barred the publication of portraits and caricatures of individuals without permission. Act of Feb.
23, 1899, ch. 29, 1899 Cal. Stat. 28 (codified at Cal. Penal Code § 258 (Deering 1915)); The AntiCartoon Law, SACRAMENTO RECORD-UNION, Feb. 24, 1899, at 2. For a discussion of this
early―though apparently never-enforced law―see ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 19.
15
See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins., Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905); Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902); Riddle v. MacFadden, 116 A.D. 353 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1906); Eliot v. Jones, 120 N.Y.S. 989 (Sup. Ct. 1910); Mackenzie v. Soden Mineral
Springs, 18 N.Y.S. 240 (Sup. Ct. 1891); Astaire v. Esquire Magazine, N.Y. L. J., Feb. 11, 1936,
at 760; see also Marks v. Jaffa, 26 N.Y.S. 908 (Sup. Ct. 1893) (privacy claim based on use of
actor’s name in newspaper popularity contest); ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 11, 21–29.
16
Roberson, 64 N.E. 442.
12
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Figure 1. Copy of Advertisement reproduced in “The Right of
Privacy,” 12 PROFITABLE ADVERTISING 187 (1902)

The image is of a young woman, Abigail Roberson. She had sat for
a portrait in a photographer’s studio―something that was very popular
at the time. The photographer, without her permission, later allowed the
photograph to be used by the Franklin Mills Flour company in
advertisements. The company used her image on approximately 25,000
lithographic ads that were distributed, and ultimately brought to Ms.
Roberson’s attention. She alleged that when she discovered the use of
her photograph she suffered a nervous shock, became bedridden, and
required medical assistance.17
Given New York’s role as the first state to expressly adopt a
privacy law, it may be surprising to discover (if you don’t already
know) that the New York Court of Appeals actually rejected Roberson’s
claim, and concluded in a 4-3 split decision that there was no common
law right to privacy in the state of New York―a conclusion that
remains firmly in place today. 18 The four judges in the majority were
sympathetic to Roberson’s plight, and thought she should have a claim,
but they were concerned about creating such a claim at common law.
They concluded that a common law-based right of privacy would be too
vague and uncertain, leading to a significant danger of shutting down
speech about public figures. They thought courts were ill-equipped to
draw lines between what were newsworthy uses and ones that were not.
17

Id.
Id.; Stephano v. News Grp. Publ’ns, 474 N.E.2d 580, 583–85 (N.Y. 1984) (rejecting the claim
that a common law right of publicity or right of privacy exists in New York State).
18
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Instead, they suggested that the legislature should tackle the problem,
and provide clear guidance on where to draw the boundaries of privacy
laws so as to limit their impact on free speech.19
Judge John Clinton Gray wrote a powerful dissent in the case. He
contended that each of us have a property right in our own names and
likenesses that we can use to stop unauthorized uses of our images for
another’s “commercial purposes or gain,” like the one made by Franklin
Mills of Ms. Roberson’s features.20 The weight of public opinion at the
time was solidly on Roberson’s side, and in agreement with Judge
Gray’s dissent. After the decision, the New York Times published an
editorial lambasting the court for its “horrible” opinion rejecting
Roberson’s right of privacy, and calling on the legislature to pass a
privacy law. Surprisingly from today’s vantage point, the newspaper
criticized the use of portable “detective” cameras to take pictures of
people on public streets, including when the subjects were public
figures, such as the President of the United States and the businessman
J. P. Morgan. The Times criticized both the taking of the photographs,
and their use in advertisements, on products, and even in newspapers.21
In the face of the outcry from the public, journalists, and scholars,
the New York legislature passed a privacy law that abrogated the
decision in Roberson. The 1903 Act to “Prevent the Unauthorized Use
of the Name or Picture of Any Person for the Purposes of Trade,” made
it both a misdemeanor and a civil cause of action to use “for advertising
purposes, or for purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any
living person” without written consent.22 This legislation remains
mostly in its original form as today’s New York Civil Rights Law
Sections 50 and 51.23 One of the few significant changes to these laws
was the addition of “voice” to the list of characteristics of a person
protected by the civil cause of action.24 Although termed the state’s
“right of privacy,” it is on its face a right of publicity law.
So the claim that New York lacks a right of publicity is simply not
true. In fact, it has one of the very first right of publicity laws adopted in
this country. Other states followed New York’s lead. Most, however,
adopted such laws under those states’ common law, and criticized the
New York Court of Appeals for requiring a legislative fix. The Georgia
Supreme Court led the way in this regard. In 1905, in Pavesich v. New
19

Roberson, 64 N.E. at 446–48.
Roberson, 64 N.E. at 448–51 (Gray, J., dissenting).
21
Right of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1902, at 8. For a more detailed discussion of Roberson
and its aftermath, see ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 22–25, 192 n. 26.
22
N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50–51(McKinney 2018) (originally enacted as Act of April 6, 1903,
ch. 132, 1903 N.Y. Laws 308).
23
See id.
24
Voice was added to New York law in 1995. Act of August 9, 1995, ch 674, 1995 N.Y. Laws
3642 (codified as N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 51).
20
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England Life Insurance, that court adopted a right of privacy under the
state’s common law.25 The case had very similar facts to those from
Roberson. The plaintiff, Paolo Pavesich, sat for a portrait, and then the
photographer allowed the image to be used in an advertisement for life
insurance without Pavesich’s permission. The Georgia Supreme Court
compared the New York court’s rejection of Roberson’s claim as so
wrong-headed that it was akin to burning innocent women at the stake
thinking they were witches.26
After New York adopted a statutory right of privacy, and Georgia
a common law one, most other states followed suit. By the early 1940s,
most states had adopted a right of privacy, and the right was an
uncontroversial, well-established claim.27 These laws were the original
right of publicity laws. These rights of privacy were understood as
synonymous with a right to stop or control “unwarranted publicity” or
“wrongful publicity” about oneself, and were often defined expressly in
these terms.28
Busting Myths About Privacy’s Failings
It is often claimed that the reason there was a turn away from the
right of privacy, and toward something different and distinct―the right
of publicity―was because the right of privacy had numerous failings. It
is claimed that the right of privacy failed to adequately protect, or even
to protect at all, public figures, and also that once information was made
public or a person entered the public arena the right of privacy was
extinguished. None of these claims, however, turn out to be true. New
York’s right of privacy is a prime example of this. It has long been
established in New York that public figures can recover damages, both
professional and personal, when their names and likenesses are used
without permission.29
Tellingly, many of the stories about privacy law’s failings did not
emerge during the heyday of privacy law, but instead largely emerged
in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, as scholars and lawyers looked back on
25

Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
Id. at 81.
Rothman, supra note 1, at 26–27.
28
Fairfield v. Am. Photocopy Equip., 291 P.2d 194, 197 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955) (emphasis
added); Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967, 970 (Ky. 1927) (emphasis added); Case Comment, The
Right to Immunity from Wrongful Publicity, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 566, 566–68 (1911) (emphasis
added); see also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 27–29; WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS, 1050, 1056 (1941). I note that the Georgia Supreme Court in Pavesich expressly
used the term “right of publicity,” and indicated that such a right long predated the right of
privacy. But what the court was likely referring to was a somewhat different concept than both
today’s right of publicity, and what other courts and scholars at the time were referring to as a
right of privacy or right of publicity. The court appears to have been referring to the right to
appear in public if one so chooses, rather than to a right to control how one appears or what is
done with one’s name or likeness. See ROTHMAN, supra note 1, 27–28.
29
ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 30–44, 194–95 nn. 1, 2, 4, 7–9.
26
27
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privacy law and tried to explain why we might need or want something
new or different, such as a right of publicity. Often these commentators
had particular motives for seeking to establish a new right, such as
furthering the interests of a client who might benefit from one primary
feature that was indeed lacking from privacy law―transferability. 30
This is a subject to which I will turn momentarily, but first I want to
highlight the reality that here in New York, and elsewhere, the right of
privacy was doing the exact work that it is so often claimed today that it
did not do.
The right of privacy did protect public figures, did allow for
recovery of economic injuries without regard to whether an emotional
harm was suffered, and did provide significant monetary recoveries. As
part of my research for the book, I read many case files from early
privacy cases here in New York that were later cited as denying
recoveries to public figures. And it turns out that these assessments of
New York’s privacy laws were incorrect.
There are numerous cases early on and throughout the history of
privacy law here in New York (and elsewhere) that provided public
figures with claims, including people who were famous and lived by
publicizing their personalities. They had successful claims even when
the images of them were taken in public, and even when the images had
already been widely circulated as publicity stills.31 Celebrity
endorsements were already common by the 1800s and active selfpromotion dates back to ancient times.32 Privacy-based claims were
most often categorized as rooted in property, and injuries to one’s
professional reputation and business harms were cognizable, including
lost endorsement fees.33 Despite claims that public figures could not
recover economic damages, numerous cases out of New York and
elsewhere granted significant monetary judgments under right of
privacy claims for economic harms.34
The True Missing Link: Transferability
Even though these myths about the failings of the right of privacy
turn out not to be true, there was one thing that the right of privacy truly
did not do―allow the rights to one’s own name, likeness, or voice to be
transferred to someone else. Recall that one of the primary goals of the
30

Rothman, supra note 1, at 68–71, 73–75.
See Rothman, supra note 1, at 30–40.
32
Id. at 30–35, 195–96 n. 10
33
Id. at 22, 24, 26, 30–35, 48–49.
34
See, e.g., Riddle v. MacFadden, 115 N.Y.S. 1142 (App. Div. 1909) (affirming jury award);
Riddle v. MacFadden, 101 N.Y.S. 606 (App. Div. 1906); Extract from Minutes, Case on Appeal
at 18, Riddle v. MacFadden, 115 N.Y.S. 1142 (on file with Author); Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of
Am., 103 N.E. 1108 (N.Y. 1913); Jack Binns to get $12,500, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1913, at 5; see
also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 30–44, 193–95, nn. 1, 4, 7–9 (documenting examples of public
figures recovering economic damages for professional injuries).
31
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proposed right of publicity bill here in New York is to make the right
“freely transferable.”35 Regardless of whether the current privacy-based
rights are considered property or not, this proposed change would shift
the right to our own name and likeness from a right that cannot be taken
away from us, to one that can be.
Why SAG-AFTRA would be at the forefront of pushing such a
change is mystifying. Most actors have no idea that the proposed bill
their representatives are trying to get passed would allow managers,
Broadway producers, film studios, television networks, Facebook,
creditors, and ex-spouses to take away from them ownership of their
own names, voices, and likenesses. That is what transferability allows.
And such transfers could last forever.
It is a particularly ironic turn of events that a union representing
actors is now advocating for a right that was originally spearheaded in
part by movie studio lawyers. The studios were looking for a new
vehicle to “own” and control their actors in the aftermath of the
invalidation of the long-term employment contracts and star system that
had dominated Hollywood for decades until the mid-1940s (and which
had been detrimental to actors). A transferable right over a person’s
identity was an attractive vehicle for the studios to be able to do so.
Such transferability was never in the interests of identity-holders (such
as actors), but was something that instead furthered the interests of
corporations that profited from using the names and likenesses of
others.36
One of the first cases to consider the transferability of a person’s
name or likeness to third parties was Pakas Co. v. Leslie, which was
decided here in New York in 1915, and involved silent movie stars. A
number of actresses gave permission to their movie studio, the
Vitagraph Company, to which they were under contract, to use their
images in a variety of ways for publicity. The studio licensed a number
of the actresses’ photos for use on poster stamps by the defendants in
the case. Without getting Vitagraph’s permission, the actresses also
gave permission to the Pakas Company, the plaintiff, to sell the same
sort of small poster stamps.37
The Pakas Company sued Arthur Leslie (among others) to stop
him and the other defendants from distributing the images of the
actresses. The particular dispute probably would have gone into the
35

New York Assembly Bill No. A08155, 2017 Leg., 240th Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
Rothman, supra note 1, at 68–71.
37
Judgment, Pakas Co. v Leslie (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 19, 1915) (on file with Author); Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Pakas Co. v. Leslie (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 19, 1915) (on file with
Author); Complaint Pakas Co. v. Leslie (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 28, 1914) (on file with Author). The
case is often incorrectly referred to as Pekas v. Leslie because of what appears to have been a
typographical error in the reporting of the case in the New York Law Journal. 52 N.Y.L.J. 1864
(Feb. 13, 1915). See also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 46–48, 57–58, 200 n.3.
36
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dustbin of obscurity if it hadn’t been plucked out by the litigants in a
case we’ll return to and that is far better known―the Haelan
Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum case from 1953.38 Pakas was cited
in Haelan for the proposition that the actresses’ privacy rights were not
transferable.39 A preliminary decision by the trial court in Pakas noted
that the right of privacy was “purely personal and not assignable” under
New York law.40 The court denied the Pakas Company’s request for a
preliminary injunction to bar the sale of the competing posterettes.41
This was the decision that was reported in the New York Law Journal,
and that led commentators to suggest that without assignability
companies could not enforce contractual agreements, or assert them as a
basis for tort claims of inducement or impairment of contract.42
But this is not what actually happened in the case. The files from
the case indicate that even without such an assignable right, the Pakas
Company could enforce its contractual rights against Leslie so long as it
did indeed have superior rights to the images in question.43 As it turns
out, many of the images that Leslie used were ones to which Vitagraph
owned the copyright, and that had been taken long before the actresses
gave Pakas permission to use their images.44 As a result, the trial court
ultimately enjoined some of Leslie’s uses, but not the ones that involved
these previously captured images of the actresses.45 Thus, the decision
in Pakas actually stood for the opposite proposition than that for which
it is so often cited. The court ultimately did allow an injunction to issue
without the right to the actresses’ names and likenesses needing to be
transferable or held by the Pakas Company.46
Other courts to consider the question of transferability also
concluded that the right of privacy was not something that could be
transferred to others, regardless of whether it was understood as a
property right. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Hanna
Manufacturing v. Hillerich & Bradsby is probably the most well known
38

Haelan Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). The filings from
Pakas were submitted to the district court in the Haelan litigation on March 13th and 14th, 1952.
The district court case was titled Bowman Gum v. Topps Chewing Gum, 103 F. Supp. 944
(E.D.N.Y. 1952) (No. 11852). All cited filings from the Haelan litigation are on file with the
Author, along with many other documents from the case. Haelan Laboratories was the name of
the plaintiff in the case for only a limited time. The original complaint was filed by a predecessor
to Haelan, Bowman Gum, and Connelly Containers became the named plaintiff after it bought
Haelan. See ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 51–63.
39
Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 868–69; Bowman Gum, 103 F. Supp. at 951.
40
Pekas [sic] Co., 52 N.Y.L.J. 1864.
41
Id.
42
Id.; Note, Possible Interests in One’s Name or Picture, 28 HARV. L. REV. 689 (1915); see also
ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 46–48.
43
Judgment, Pakas Co. v Leslie (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 19, 1915).
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.; ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 46–48.
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of these cases.47 Hanna involved a lawsuit brought by Hillerich &
Bradsby, the makers of the famous Louisville Slugger bats that had
players’ names and signatures printed on them. Hillerich & Bradsby
sued Hanna, another company that was making similar bats with
players’ names printed on them, claiming that only it could make such
bats. Although the federal appellate court concluded that the players had
property rights in their names, it held that such property was not
“vendible in gross,” and could not be assigned to Hillerich & Bradsby. 48
This conclusion led commentators to (inaccurately) criticize the
decision for leaving Hillerich & Bradsby without recourse.49 In fact, the
court did allow an injunction in the case against deceptive uses that
would lead consumers to conclude that the Hanna bats were endorsed
by the players.50 The court, however, allowed Hanna to continue to sell
bats with players’ names on them, as long it was clear that they were not
sponsored by the players. This conclusion had nothing to do with
transferability or the question of whether an assignment of rights had
been made. Instead, the court allowed these nonconfusing uses on free
speech grounds. The court held that the public had a right to receive
truthful information about the bats, including that a particular bat was
designed in the style of one favored by a particular player. As long as
consumers were not deceived, such useful information was protected
speech.51
Enter Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum
Both Pakas Co. and Hanna Manufacturing figured prominently in
the thinking and briefs in Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision from 1953.52 It is
commonly said that Haelan marked the birth of the right of publicity.53

47

Hanna Mfg. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 78 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1935).
Id.
49
See, e.g., Haelan Labs, 202 F.2d at 869; Bowman Gum v. Topps Chewing Gum, 103 F. Supp.
944; see also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 48–50, 201 n. 8.
50
Hanna Mfg., 78 F.2d at 767–68.
51
Id.; see also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 48–50 (discussing case files in Hanna and analyzing
commentary that followed decision).
52
Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 867 (2d Cir. 1953); Brief for
Defendant, Haelan Labs. (No. 22564), at 29–39, 66 (on file with Author); Bowman Gum v.
Topps Chewing Gum, 103 F. Supp. 944, 948–54; see also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, 50–64, 201–
03 nn. 8–27, 29–33 (telling story of Haelan litigation on the basis of detailed review of case files
from district court, federal court of appeals, and state court filings).
53
See, e.g., Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 658 F.2d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 1982); Stacey L.
Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58
STANFORD L. REV. 1161, 1172–73 (2006); Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity:
Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1199,
1201 (1986); Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of Publicity: Is
There Commercial Life After Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125 (1980); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right
of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 204, 218–23 (1954); see also ROTHMAN, supra
48
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If any of you have studied the right of publicity before, that’s probably
what you understand to be the case. But in fact, it’s not true. Haelan
neither coined the term “right of publicity,” nor created the concept,
which, as I have discussed, both long pre-dated the case.54
Haelan was a case that potentially raised the issue of
transferability, but it was really a case about the validity and
enforceability of contracts. It involved baseball trading cards that were
included in packages of gum and other candy. The baseball players gave
permission and received payment from two different companies (and
other licensing agencies) for such uses. The problem was that the
players had given permission to both companies to do so.55
The defendant in the case, Topps Chewing Gum, either to avoid
sorting through the nearly 2,000 contracts in the case or because the
plaintiff’s contracts predated theirs, made a creative, if ultimately losing
argument. Topps contended that the contracts were simply waivers of
privacy claims, and therefore were not enforceable against Topps, nor
could they form the basis of an impairment of contract claim. Although
this argument originally did not persuade the trial judge, upon
reconsideration the trial judge tossed the case on these grounds,
concluding that the contracts were mere waivers of the right to sue for
privacy violations, and could not form the basis of a tort against Topps.
Because of this framing, the plaintiff on appeal (now Haelan Labs.),
contended that although that argument was incorrect, if the court
thought otherwise, then what the contracts did was not waive privacy
rights, but instead assign the players’ rights to their names and
likenesses.56
There is much more to say about Haelan. An entire chapter of my
book is devoted to telling the story of the case―one that we have not
heard before, and that was revealed to me after I went into the archives,
and read the case files both at the appellate and trial court level, as well
as related state court files.57 But for our purposes here, I want to
primarily highlight that our conventional understanding of the case, as
providing a claim to baseball players who otherwise would have been
left without any way to protect against uses of their names and
likenesses, is utterly untrue. The baseball players long had claims under
New York’s right of privacy statute for such unauthorized uses on the
trading cards. Both Haelan’s predecessor company, Bowman Gum, and
Topps Chewing Gum knew this, and therefore got the written consent of
each player to use his name and image on the cards, and paid (or
note 1, at 45–46, 199–200 n. 1 (providing numerous examples of scholars and jurists making this
erroneous claim).
54
ROTHMAN, supra note 1, 11–64, 67–86.
55
Id. at 50–64
56
ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 45–64, 201–03 nn. 8–27, 29–33.
57
Id.
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promised to pay) each player for the use.58
The Second Circuit opinion in Haelan highlighted that the case
was about contracts and the tort of inducement, and that the trial court
needed to develop the record to determine whether the “defendant,
knowing of the [Bowman] contract, deliberately induced the ball-player
to break that promise[.]” But the opinion did not stop there. It also
suggested that if Topps’s view of the right of privacy was correct, then
“in addition to and independent of that right of privacy[], a man has a
right in the publicity value of his photograph.” The court dubbed this a
“right of publicity.”59
It is not clear that the appellate court thought it had created
something new. But the majority opinion suggested that the “right to
grant the exclusive privilege of publishing” a person’s likeness may
validly be granted “in gross” without any related transfer of an
underlying business or ongoing connection to the individual player. 60 It
was this aside in the opinion, likely mere dicta, that set up the future
focus on transferability in right of publicity laws, and a shift in our
understanding of what was meant by both the right of privacy and the
right of publicity.
Notably, Judge Thomas Walter Swan’s concurrence in the case
criticized this unnecessary tangent in the majority opinion. He thought
the decision should rest solely on the intentional inducement claim for
encouraging players “to breach a contract which gave plaintiff the
exclusive privilege of using [a ball-player’s] picture.”61 Swan therefore
thought there was no need to engage with the right of privacy or
publicity.62
The litigants in the case and the trial judge agreed with Swan’s
reading of the decision, and did not think the opinion created a new type
of claim. Instead, they all understood the decision as simply an
admonishment to the trial court judge that he would have to sort through
all of the contracts to determine which were valid, and which had
priority.63
To the extent courts (almost all federal ones) later read Haelan
otherwise―and as creating a new and transferable right of publicity in
New York―New York courts expressly rejected this reading of the
state’s law. There is no independent or common law right of publicity in
New York State as of April 2018.64
58

ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 45–64; see also Jansen v. Hilo Packing, 118 N.Y.S.2d 162 (Sup.
Ct. 1952).
59
Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 867–68.
60
Id. at 868.
61
Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 870 (Swan, J., concurring).
62
Id.
63
ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 62–64, 67–68, 203–04 nn. 30–33.
64
Id. at 64; Stephano v. News Grp. Publ’n., 474 N.E.2d 580, 583–85 (N.Y. 1984).
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Movie Studios and Heirs, Not Ballplayers
Nevertheless, Haelan raised the possibility that the right to one’s
own identity could be transferred away to a corporation. It is often
claimed, based on Haelan, that transferability was essential for
individuals to monetize their identities, but that has never been true.
Having a transferable right of publicity was never for the benefit of the
individuals. This reality is highlighted by looking at who was
advocating for such transferability during the decades that followed
Haelan.65
The language from Haelan gave ideas to movie studio lawyers and
others who saw an opportunity to get more control over and money out
of their actors, and other public personalities. Transferability was a
great idea for studios who could own their actors once again after the
demise of the star system by having their actors transfer rights over their
names and likenesses to the studios. One of the prime examples of such
an advocate is Melville Nimmer, who wrote one of the most famous and
influential articles about the right of publicity while working as an
attorney at one of the major studios, Paramount Pictures.66
One of Nimmer’s scenarios used to demonstrate the need for a
transferable right of publicity was to give a film company the ability to
stop one of its actresses from appearing in multiple bathing suit ads
without the permission of the movie studio. He thought it was the studio
that should get to decide what sorts of photo shoots and advertisements
its actors could do. A transferable right of publicity could stop actresses
from double-booking, as the baseball players had done in Haelan, and
from appearing in ads that a movie studio thought inappropriate, or that
were simply not what it had in mind for a particular actress’s image.67
Even without a transferable right, companies could enforce
contracts against the players (and actors), and collect damages for
breaches of agreements, such as to only appear on one baseball card (or
in one company’s advertisement for swimsuits). But a total transfer of
rights would give even more control to the owner of the players’ and
actors’ names and likenesses.68
Who else thought that transferability was a great idea? Heirs and
others who had an interest in dead people, particularly one in Elvis, who
died in 1977. One of the main driving forces behind the proliferation of
a transferable right of publicity were arguments by those who stood to
profit from the deceased. If the right of publicity is personal to the
65

ROTHMAN, supra note 1, 67–86, 116–17; see, e.g., Harold R. Gordon, Right of Property in
Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 553 (1960); Nimmer, supra note 53.
66
Nimmer, supra note 53.
67
See Nimmer, supra note 53, at 209–10; see also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 68–71.
68
For a more in-depth discussion of the many alternative methods of enforcing rights to exclusive
contracts that were wrongly dismissed by advocates for an independent and transferable right of
publicity, see ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 68–71.
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individual, even if it’s a property right, it dies with that person. Whereas
if it’s transferable, it can survive death, and the dead person can produce
income for the living.69
Tellingly, the primary advocate for making Elvis’s right of
publicity survive his death was Elvis’s manager, Colonel Tom Parker,
not his family. Parker had taken the vast majority of Elvis’s earnings
while he was alive. Elvis earned only 22% of the revenue from
merchandise, while Parker earned close to 60% of the revenue. Parker
wanted Elvis to keep him rich even after he was dead, and even at the
expense of Elvis’s family who would later fight the manager over rights
and royalties.70 Parker’s efforts to keep Elvis alive (at least
commercially, after his literal death) was integral to the adoption of
postmortem rights in many states.71
So What Should New York Do?
With this backdrop of some of the history of how New York’s law
got where it is, and how the right of publicity developed, we are back at
the questions with which we started. Should New York change its right
of privacy laws, and, if so, how? At this point I’ve debunked the claim
that New York doesn’t have a right of publicity. It does. So the question
is not whether New York should have a right of publicity, but whether it
should change its law to make the right a transferable one, and also
whether it should provide a similar right after death. These are distinct
questions.
Bar or Limit Transferability
There are many downsides to having a freely transferable right,
and few upsides. As discussed, transferability is not required to protect
rights to one’s name or likeness, nor to profit from authorizing such
uses. A transferable right would mean that another person or company
could take rights to a person’s identity away from that person, and own
them separate and apart from the underlying identity-holder. I have
questioned in my prior work whether such a separation is even possible.
But even if it were, it presents the chilling prospect of a person losing
69

ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 67–68, 73–75, 81–86.
ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 84; see also Factors Etc. v. Creative Card, 444 F. Supp. 279, 280–
83 (S.D. N.Y. 1977); Robert Hilburn, Eternal Revenue: Elvis’ Millions Were Disappearing When
Priscilla Presley Took Charge and Rebuilt the King’s Fortune, L. A. MAGAZINE, June 11, 1989,
at 10, 18; Parker is Accused of Cheating Presley in Royalty Dealings, GLOBE AND MAIL, August
3, 1981, at 15.
71
See, e.g., Factors Etc. v. Pro Arts, 701 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983); Factors Etc. v. Pro Arts, 652
F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981); Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980);
Factors Etc. v. Pro Arts, 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978); State ex rel. Elvis Presly Int’l Mem’l
Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987); see also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at
84–86; Personal Rights Protection Act of 1984, ch. 945, § 1, 1984 Tenn. Pub. Acts 950 (codified
at Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-1101).
70
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control over her own identity.72
As an example, consider the pop star Bruno Mars. He is the
“identity-holder” of his own name, voice, likeness, and other indicia of
his identity. If the right of publicity were transferable, then his record
company, Atlantic Records, could insist that he assign his right of
publicity to it, thereby becoming the “publicity-holder” of his identity,
including his name, likeness, and voice.73 Bruno Mars has enough
power now that he would not need to sign such an all-encompassing
transfer of his rights, but that is not true of those starting out in the
music business.
What could publicity-holders do with a person’s identity? And
what could they stop the identity-holder from doing? The boundaries of
this are not entirely clear, but in my book I consider the example of
Ariana Grande. Suppose that an early manager of hers—she was a child
star―had her, or likely her parents, sign a broad, perpetual, allencompassing exclusive assignment of her identity to him, including the
rights to her name, likeness, and voice.74 Some managers have obtained
such assignments, and they are commonplace particularly in the world
of adult entertainment.75
If such transfers were allowed, Grande would not be able to
reclaim those rights when she turned 18, and would be at least partially
under the control of her first manager, even if she changed her
representation. Grande is vegan and might want to support PETA
(People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals), an animal rights
organization, do a promotional campaign for the nonprofit, or perhaps a
commercial encouraging people to eat more tofu, instead of meat.76 If
her manager thinks vegans are sort of weird and wacky, and won’t have
broad commercial appeal, he could potentially block Grande from
publicly supporting PETA, and from doing campaigns for the
organization or for a tofu company. The manager could even authorize
the use of her name and likeness for use in an Oscar Meyer lunch meat
advertisement, something which would be anathema to Grande. Several
federal and state laws and regulations might limit the use of Grande’s
72

For a more in-depth discussion of the challenges and dangers of transferability, see ROTHMAN,
supra note 1, at 115–37; Jennifer E. Rothman, The Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO L. J.
185 (2012).
73
I developed the terminology and distinction between “identity-holders” and “publicity-holders”
in Rothman, The Inalienable Right of Publicity, supra note 72, at 186–188. This specific example
is taken from ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 116.
74
ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 130–31.
75
See, e.g., Corey v. Nintendo Am., 592 N.Y.S.2d 6, 7–8 (App. Div. 1993); Perfect 10 v. CCBill
LLC, 488 F.23d 1102, 1008 (9th Cir. 2007); see also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 119–22, 215–16
n. 9–12.
76
Michelle Kretzer, Ariana Grande Goes Vegan―and That’s Not All, PETA,
https://www.peta.org/blog/ariana-grande-goes-vegan/
[https://perma.cc/7M2R-F6VA]
(last
visited May 17, 2018); ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 130–131.
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name or image, if the use falsely suggested she personally ate meat or
endorsed the product, but otherwise if the manager owns Grande’s right
of publicity, he is within his rights to use her name and likeness as he
sees fit.77 That’s one of the downsides to having a transferable right of
publicity.
This is problematic even in contexts that we might think of as
voluntary―which this hypothetical fits into; either she or her parents
voluntarily assigned her right of publicity to the manager. This is not
pure fiction. Contestants on reality television shows often sign very
broad contracts, that assign their life story rights, their names,
likenesses, and voices to the producers. Facebook has at various points
included very onerous terms, including ones that give it the right to use
your name and image to advertise without additional permission.78 It’s
not exclusive, but given how often the company changes its terms of
service without making the changes apparent, it would be naïve to rely
on the company to protect users from transfers of their rights of
publicity either to Facebook or to third parties. Parents also sometimes
sign away the rights of their children, sometimes intentionally,
sometimes unwittingly. For example, Brooke Shields’s mother assigned
rights over Shields’s image, at least for limited purposes, and Shields
has tried in vain to regain control after her mother assigned her right of
publicity to photographers.79 There is no provision in the proposed bill
for children to regain their rights of publicity at the age of 18 if their
parents have assigned such rights to a third party or even to themselves.
The history of the abuse of child actors by their parents and guardians
led to the passage of laws in California to protect child actors from
parents who profited off their children’s work, while leaving their
children destitute.80 Making the right of publicity broadly transferable
would provide a platform for future abuses of child actors, and of
children more broadly.
If the right of publicity is transferable, it also can be involuntarily
transferred to creditors, after judgments or in bankruptcy proceedings. It
could also be divisible in divorces, something that would allow one’s
77

Rothman, supra note 1, at 130–34.
See, e.g., Andy Denhart, Survivor contestant contract: the waivers, agreements that cast
members,
families
sign,
REALITY
BLURRED
(MAY
31,
2010
7:00),
https://www.realityblurred.com/realitytv/2010/05/survivor-cast-contract/ [https://perma.cc/2V9JFJF5]; Facebook Terms of Service ¶¶ 2, 9, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last
updated January 30, 2015) [http://perma.cc/W35F-GCYL]; see also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at
119–21, 215 n. 10.
79
Shields v. Gross, 448 N.E. 2d 108, 109, 111 (N.Y. 1983).
80
-Cal.
Fam.
Code
§§
6750–6753;
Coogan
Law,
SAG-AFTRA,
http://www.sagaftra.org/content/coogan-law [https://perma.cc/GQ45-A3KZ] (last visited May 10,
2018); see also Faloona by Fredrickson v. Hustler Magazine, 799 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1986);
Shields v. Gross, 448 N.E.2d 108, 109, 111 (N.Y. 1983); Complaint, Gonzales v. Gonzales, No.
CV-15-5498-DMG (C.D. Cal. July 20, 2015) (child sued to stop mother from transferring her
right of publicity and trademark in her own name and clothing line).
78

ROTHMAN ESSAY (Do Not Delete)

2018]

PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR NEW YORK?

6/4/2018 3:18 PM

591

ex-spouse to literally own a percentage of your name, likeness and
voice.81 In a case involving football legend and Hertz pitchman O. J.
Simpson, the family of Ron Goldman won a wrongful death suit against
Simpson for killing Goldman and Simpson’s ex-wife Nicole Brown
Simpson. Although Simpson was acquitted in the criminal trial, he lost
the civil case against him. Simpson vowed that he would never pay the
multi-million dollar judgment against him, and even moved out of
California to Florida to shelter his money using Florida’s exemption of
primary residences from assets available to creditors. The Goldman
family filed a motion to have the copyright in Simpson’s book, If I Did
It, transferred to them. The court did not hesitate to do so. And the
Goldman family then published the book making the “If” in the title so
small that to most eyes it would simply read “I Did It.” They also added
an Introduction to the book titled “He Did It.”82
The Goldmans also filed a motion to have Simpson’s right of
publicity transferred to them. If the right is truly transferable, it should
also have been transferred to the Goldman family, just as Simpson’s
copyright to the book was. A California trial court, however, denied the
motion. The court concluded that the right of publicity could not and
should not be transferred. The judge compared such a transfer of
Simpson’s right of publicity as akin to forcing Simpson into
“involuntary servitude,” something that would violate his right to
liberty.83
This decision, barring the transfer of Simpson’s right of publicity
to a creditor, is the right one, but we should not rely solely on judges to
put up such roadblocks to transferability in individual cases. There
should be a well-established limit on the right that precludes its transfer
away from identity-holders. States should not add language to their
laws, as the proposed New York bill does, that makes the right of
publicity “freely transferable.”84 Advocates for such transferability may
think that courts will strike down the most troubling of these transfers,
but it is a dangerous business for New York to add such a broad
provision, simply hoping for the best when courts review the
constitutionality of such transfers down the road.
So what is SAG-AFTRA thinking? What is the advantage of
having such a transferable right of publicity? For their most successful
members, there may be some tax advantages to putting the property of
their names and likenesses in a corporation from which all the income
would flow, and be considered and taxed as capital gains. But even
81

ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 118–19, 122–33.
ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 117–19; see also In re Lorraine Brooke Ass’n., Inc., No. 07-12641BKC-AJC, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. July 2, 2007); Goldman v. Simpson, No. SC036340 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2006).
83
Goldman, slip op. at 12; see also Rothman, supra note 1, 117–19, 122–24, 128–33.
84
New York Assembly Bill No. A08155, 2017 Leg., 240th Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
82
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without a transferable right, successful actors can set up a variety of
corporate vehicles to reduce their tax burden. Nor do any tax savings
compensate for the broader downsides of permitting complete
alienability of a person’s identity, not just for these successful
performers, but for everyone.
Many of the other purported advantages of transferability simply
do not stand up to scrutiny. One can have an agent, manager and
publicist who help shape and monitor your public personality and
professional career without them needing to own your identity. One can
also make exclusive licensing deals without needing to assign one’s
rights―though as I have highlighted elsewhere, these deals need to be
limited in scope and duration so as not to become the practical
equivalent of assignments.85 Limiting the scope of such licenses is
another missed opportunity for law reform. If one is going to open up
the current right of privacy in the state, the goal should be to improve it,
not to make it worse.
Nor is transferability of the right of publicity for the living
required to provide postmortem rights. A separate law could be drafted
that provides a right to control uses of a dead person’s name, likeness,
and voice.
Paying Our Respect to the Living and the Dead
With regard to whether New York should offer postmortem rights,
it is often said that it should do so solely because California provides a
postmortem right of publicity.86 But this is an unconvincing argument.
States are solidly divided over the question, with only about half
recognizing a postmortem right. And some states that do provide such a
right, offer only a very narrow right (for example, limited only to
deceased soldiers). The terms of postmortem rights even in states that
recognize a broader right still vary widely―some states provide for a
ten year duration, others thirty, and some terms are as long as one
hundred years.87
Even states that are geographically close to New York have widely
differing views on the subject. Massachusetts, for example, which based
its right of privacy statute on New York’s, does not provide a
postmortem right.88 Connecticut does not seem to either, although one
85
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federal district court guessed that maybe the state would. 89 Similarly,
New Jersey does not have a postmortem right, although several federal
courts have concluded that the state would recognize such a right.90
Such federal pronouncements are not binding, however, and similar
decisions by federal courts have subsequently been rejected by state
courts.91
Pennsylvania does provide a statutory postmortem right of 30
years, but only for those who died domiciled in the state, and who were
actively commercializing their identities at the time of death. 92 Moving
slightly further away from New York, Delaware, Rhode Island and
Vermont have not recognized a postmortem right.93 So there is hardly a
consensus in the Northeast on whether there should be a postmortem
right in the first place. Clearly, New York is not an outlier by not
providing such a right.
We therefore need to consider in the first place what justifies
offering such a postmortem right in New York. If some type of right to
a person’s identity should survive death, then understanding why is
essential to determine the appropriate scope and duration of that right.
Many of the top-earning celebrities are dead.94 Is that a good
thing? I don’t know. I think there are good reasons to think that it is not,
and that our economy should focus more on investing in the living. Why
should heirs get a monetary windfall after someone dies, at the expense
of the public? Any payout to heirs is unlikely to (significantly)
incentivize the dead person while she is living. And you cannot reward
the dead. That doesn’t mean we shouldn’t have a postmortem right, it
just means that we should look at whether there are reasons to have such
89
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a right primarily on behalf of the living. Surviving relatives who were
close to the deceased might be harmed by seeing a loved one crassly
commercialized, spread across advertisements, reanimated on TV,
plastered on billboards, or recreated for sex toys, particularly when their
loss is recent.95
Let’s consider the example of the acclaimed musician and pop star
Prince, who recently died without a will. His estate now is held by a
number of estranged relatives with whom he apparently was not close,
and had little contact.96 Although we can no longer ask him, it might
well be that Prince would have preferred that his fans be given free rein
to honor him with in memoriam posters, buttons, and t-shirts, rather
than to transfer a windfall to distant relatives simply because of a shared
genetic connection. In fact, Minnesota, where Prince lived, like New
York, does not have a postmortem right of publicity. 97 The state
recently considered adopting such a right, but ultimately set aside the
idea (at least for now). I am told the heirs and the legislators worried
about the potentially staggering estate tax bill that the heirs would not
be able to pay if a postmortem right of publicity was added to the
estate’s assets. To pay off such a bill Prince’s identity would have to be
fully commercialized even though neither he nor his heirs would likely
want that.98
The legislature may also have recalled that Prince was very
outspoken about not wanting to be owned by anyone―particularly his
record label. He had “slave” written on his cheek and changed his name
to an unpronounceable symbol when Warner Brothers owned his name
(for the duration of his recording contract).99 It is unlikely that Prince
would have changed his tune so that he would want to be owned in the
afterlife. In light of this, those who support creating a postmortem right
would be wise to consider limiting the right to instances in which the
deceased actively chose with whom any such postmortem right of
publicity should vest, and provide an option to terminate those rights
95
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rather than to have them continue after death.100
The law should also limit the ability for a market in dead and
dying people to emerge. There is a ghoulish prospect that such a law
would encourage the buying up of aging celebrities’ rights, and shift
wealth to corporations that have no relationship with the deceased at the
expense of the broader public. Consider the pin-up model and actress
Bettie Page (who died in a state with postmortem rights), whose identity
is now owned by CMG Worldwide, a company that owns and manages
primarily dead people. Before she died, Page assigned an agent of the
company her postmortem right of publicity. 101 The company has turned
Page into one of the top earning dead people. It has developed a
clothing line, and runs a Bettie Page Twitter account where “Page”
tweets from beyond the grave to her 23,000 followers. CMG also
authorized a line of adult sex toys using Page’s name and image. Page,
who later in life became a born-again Christian, may well have found
such uses highly offensive.102
Providing such a lucrative monopoly to companies is not a
compelling (or even legitimate) basis for New York or any other state to
add a postmortem right of publicity, and suggests that any such right
should be limited to natural persons. Ideally, even the natural persons
who can receive such rights should be limited to those either expressly
designated by the deceased, or perhaps those provided in a list of
statutory heirs in the absence of such an affirmative designation by the
deceased.
The very best arguments for providing a postmortem right of
publicity are to protect the dignitary and emotional interests of the close
survivors, such as a child, who might not want to see her parent’s image
and name used on a sex toy line, particularly in the aftermath of the
parent’s death. This suggests not only that any postmortem right should
be limited to natural persons, but also that the duration should not
exceed those first heirs’ lifetimes.
This survivor-based analysis also suggests that the right only
makes sense if it can block commercialization. Yet, one of the main
problems of creating a postmortem right of publicity is that the estate
tax―if it continues to exist―forces commercialization. This is true
because the tax is determined on the basis of the “highest and best use”
of the property―which is interpreted as a fully commercialized use of
the property that maximizes its economic value.103 This determination
100
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dismisses the value to the survivors of not commercializing their loved
one, and can force the very commercialization and reanimation that
extending rights after death is supposed to prevent. To pay off the tax
bill, heirs of those with the most valuable postmortem identities may be
forced to commercialize their loved ones even if that is not what they
would like to see happen.104
This issue is currently being litigated by Michael Jackson’s estate,
which is fighting with the IRS over a $400 million difference in the
valuation of his right of publicity, and other rights related to his name
and likeness in the estate’s tax bill.105 Robin Williams’s estate tried to
craft a testamentary instrument to avoid the danger of his family being
forced to commercialize his name and likeness after his death just to
pay a tax bill. To do so, his trust bars any commercialization for twentyfive years after his death, and vests his right of publicity in a nonprofit
corporation.106 If New York actually wants to help families like Robin
Williams’s to honor their loved ones, it would draft a bill focused on
blocking commercialization, not forcing it.
When we think about postmortem rights, we also must think about
what we lose by extending rights to control uses of a person’s name and
likeness after death. For example, the Martin Luther King Jr. estate―at
least the part that owns the rights to his name and likeness―blocked the
sale of statues of King that members of the public bought to celebrate
the deceased civil rights hero’s life, and his message of justice and
equality for all.107 The estate has also demanded (and received) payment
for uses of his name, voice, or likeness in films, and on the national
monument erected in his honor.108 Despite blocking and discouraging
such respectful tributes, the estate had no problem authorizing the use of
Mgmt.132-3d (1986); Jeffrey K. Eisen & Allan E. Biblin, Estate Planning for Clients in
Entertainment Business, 33 EST. PLAN 26, 32–33 (2006); Ray D. Madoff, Taxing Personhood:
Estate Taxes and the Compelled Commodification of Identity, 17 VA. TAX. REV. 759 (1998);
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104
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105
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106
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challenges will no doubt occur.
107
Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change v. Am. Heritage Prods., 296 S.E. 2d 697 (Ga.
1982); ROTHMAN, supra note at 1, 5, 102, 142, 184, 220 n. 8.
108
Rothman, The Market in Dead People, supra note 95; April Glaser, Yes, the Martin Luther
King Jr. Estate Approved that Ram Trucks Super Bowl Ad, SLATE (FEB. 4, 2018 9:49 PM),
https://slate.com/business/2018/02/the-mlk-estate-approved-that-dodge-ram-super-bowl-ad.html
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King’s name, voice, and image in a 2018 Super Bowl commercial for
Dodge trucks, using excerpts from his “Drum Major” speech. There was
public outrage over this use, with many finding it highly offensive.
Interestingly, his surviving daughter noted that neither she nor his
widow (Coretta Scott King)’s foundation had anything to do with the
approval process for the advertisement, and that they do not control the
rights to King’s name or likeness.109
This sort of postmortem right makes little sense. It shuts down
public discourse about public figures, without furthering the personal
and dignitary interests of the surviving heirs that best justify the
extension of the right after death. Such a right can also shut down our
collective mourning over the death of public figures, from civil rights
heroes to musicians to actors to politicians. So any postmortem right
needs to have robust speech protections, including exemptions for uses
of dead people’s names, likenesses, voices, and other indicia of their
identities in expressive works, and news reporting.110
The Digital Avatar Problem
With regard to the concern over the reanimation of actors’
performances, that is something we can talk more about on the panel
that follows this lecture, but this is an important issue that potentially
threatens the livelihood of actors and other performers. However,
current laws may well already address this concern. The use of a
person’s portrait and likeness without permission fits squarely within
New York’s right of privacy statute, so digital avatars already fall
within the existing law, at least when used in advertising or for other
“purposes of trade.”111
One of the few cases to have been brought objecting to a
reanimated performance by an actor, was actually brought in California
in the 1980s, long before today’s technology made such uses easier and
more seamless. An actor who had been replaced in the sequel to Back to
the Future sued over the recreation of his performance. The litigation
quickly settled with a large payout to the actor. The film had tried to
pass off the replacement actor as the original one, and the studio
realized it was on shaky ground in doing so.112 Movie studios that have
recreated performances recently, such as those of Carrie Fisher (before
109
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her death) in the Star Wars franchise, have gotten permission to do
so.113
Movie producers and others should not be able to recreate
performances of actors and pass them off as a new and authentic
performance by the actor without that actor’s permission. The danger of
such recreated performances is a real one. It could substitute for actors’
services, and destroy their ability to make a living. This is an existential
threat to the acting profession. If current laws do not provide adequate
protection against the reanimation of performances or uses of digital
avatars, then a limited, separate law to address that very real and
legitimate concern would be appropriate. It can also be a subject of
collective bargaining between the motion picture industry and SAGAFTRA.
Concluding Thoughts
New York could make no changes to its privacy statute and be
satisfied with the strong protections its law currently provides. New
York has a right of publicity already. As I have shown, it is one of the
very first such rights to have been adopted in the country. Citizens of
the state also have access to a host of related claims that provide
protection against unauthorized uses of a person’s identity and
performance. For example, claims for trademark infringement, false
endorsement, and copyright infringement can all be brought in the state,
and already provide some protections for the deceased.114
Although it is not necessary, some limited postmortem right
focused on the personal (rather than the economic) interests of the
survivors might be appropriate, particularly if limited to claims by
natural persons, and if focused on blocking, rather than spurring,
113
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commercialization. Any such right, however, must have ample and
explicit protections for free speech.
A separate reanimation law might also be appropriate―but may
already be covered at least in part under existing law. Addressing these
issues does not require turning the right of publicity in the state into
something transferable that can be taken away from the very people the
law seeks to protect. Nor does it require adding a broad postmortem
right, if the concern is that reanimated dead actors will replace the living
ones.
If the New York legislature proceeds with a major revision to its
privacy laws, it should keep in mind some of the insights from this talk,
and from my book. The law should expressly bar—or at the very least
significantly limit—the transferability of the right of publicity.
Legislators should also consider making some other changes to
improve, rather than worsen matters. The legislature should consider
adding broad and express exemptions to protect free speech and creative
expression. Nevertheless, privacy and publicity-based claims need not
be limited to commercial speech―the statute should allow actions
against some exploitative noncommercial uses, such as the posting of
sexually intimate images without permission (a.k.a. revenge porn), or
the impersonation of others to lure dates (a.k.a. catfishing). The
legislature should also consider adding statutory damages so that those
without bankable personalities can still exercise control over their
identities, such as to stop Facebook from using their names and
likenesses on sponsored ads without permission.115 New York’s privacy
and publicity law is not broken, and remains a robust force even in the
21st Century, just as it was in the 20th century. Any changes to the law
should be done thoughtfully and carefully, taking into consideration
both the reasons for making the changes, and any potential pitfalls of
those changes.
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